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A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO TESTIFY - THE IMPLICATIONS OF UNITED
STATES EX REL. WILCOX v. JOHNSON
MARY BELL HAMMERMANt
T HE SECOND TRIAL OF NORMAN WILCOX on the charge of
rape was argued before a jury in the County Court of
Philadelphia.' The defendant believed that his defense would be
predicated on an alibi theory; 2 however, at the close of the
Commonwealth's case, defendant's counsel informed him for the
first time that a consent theory would be advanced instead.
3
Defendant thereupon protested this change of strategy to his
counsel, demanding to testify in his own behalf and to introduce
evidence to support an alibi defense.4 Believing that the defendant's
testimony would be perjured,5 the defense counsel refused to permit
him to take the stand.6 Moreover, counsel advised the trial judge in a
sidebar conference that she would request to withdraw from the case
if the defendant were permitted to testify over her objection.
7
t B.S., Temple University, 1958; J.D., Temple University Law School, 1962.
Member, Pennsylvania Bar Association.
Ms. Hammerman was the attorney for appellee, Norman Wilcox, in United
States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1977), the case which is the
focal point of this article.
1. See United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 116 (3d Cir. 1977).
The defendant had been previously tried on the same charge in a nonjury trial before
the County Court of Philadelphia. See id. Finding that the defendant's constitutional
rights were violated when the state court judge delivered a verdict before affording the
defense an opportunity to present a closing statement, the federal district court
granted a writ of habeas corpus. United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Pennsylvania, 273 F.
Supp. 923, 924 (E.D. Pa. 1967). However, issuance of the writ was stayed to allow a
retrial in the state court. Id. at 926.
2. See 555 F.2d at 116. Since an alibi theory had been advanced at defendant's
first trial, he expected the same defense to be presented at his retrial. See id.
3. See id. The defense counsel had previously indicated, during the voire dire
examination of jury members, that she would rely on a consent theory rather than an
alibi defense. See id. The potential jurors were asked "whether they [felt] that a man
should be punished for having sexual relationships with a woman out of wedlock." Id.
at 116 n.3.
4. See id. at 117.
5. See id. In a subsequent proceeding for a writ of habeas corpus, the defense
counsel could not provide an explanation for this belief, but merely "recalffed] that
that was her conclusion." Notes of Testimony at 90, United States ex rel. Wilcox v.
Johnson, No. 73-313 (E.D. Pa. June 8, 1976). For a discussion of the habeas corpus
proceeding, see notes 12-22 and accompanying text infra.
6. See 555 F.2d at 117. Counsel advanced several reasons other than fear of
perjury for refusing the defendant's request to testify. First, by not presenting a
defense, she would be able to make the final argument to the jury. See id. at 117 n.4.
Second, she wished to avoid impeachment of defendant's credibility on cross
examination. See id.
7. See id. at 117.
(678)
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Confronted with the trial judge's ruling that counsel would be
allowed to withdraw and -that he would have to represent himself if
he insisted on taking the stand,8 the defendant decided not to
testify.9 Consequently, the defense rested without presenting any
evidence. 10 Defendant was convicted and sentenced to a prison
term. 1
Having exhausted his state remedies, 12 defendant sought a writ
of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania. 13 The district court concluded that the
defendant had a constitutional right to testify under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 14 The court ruled further that
only the defendant, and not his counsel, could validly waive this
right.15 Finding no effective waiver by the defendant, the district
court held that the trial judge's ruling infringed upon defendant's
constitutional right to testify and denied him the right to a fair
trial. 16 Based upon the deprivation of the defendant's constitutional
rights, the district court granted the writ of habeas corpus.
17
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, alleging that the
defendant was not denied a fair trial. 18 The state maintained that
there was no constitutional right to testify and that counsel's waiver
of defendant's statutory right to testify19 was valid because it was
made as a matter of trial strategy.20 The Third Circuit, in United
8. See id. Although a record of the sidebar conference is inexplicably absent
from the transcript of the state trial, the federal district court found that the trial
judge had ruled that defense counsel would be permitted to withdraw if the defendant
persisted in his demand to testify. See id.
9. See id. In granting defendant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the federal
district court concluded that the defendant would have taken the stand but for the
trial judge's ruling that the consequence of testifying would be the loss of his right to
counsel. See id. See also notes 12-17 and accompanying text supra.
10. See 555 F.2d at 117.
11. See id.
12. See id. Defendant petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus after post-trial
motions, direct appeals and collateral attacks proved unsuccessful in the state courts.
See id.
13. United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, No. 73-313 (E.D. Pa. June 8, 1976).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See 555 F.2d at 117.
15. See 555 F.2d at 117.
16. See id.
17. See id. See also note 68 infra.
18. 555 F.2d at 117.
19. Section 681 of Pennsylvania's criminal procedure statute provides that "all
persons shall be fully competent witnesses in any criminal proceeding before any
tribunal." 19 PA. STAT. ANN. § 681 (Purdon 1964).
20. 555 F.2d at 117. See notes 5-6 and accompanying text supra.
1977-1978]
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States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson,21 affirmed the grant of the writ of
habeas corpus, holding that the defendant was "unconstitutionally
deprived of the right to testify at his own trial.
'22
Historically, the right of a criminal defendant to testify in his
own behalf was not recognized at common law.23 Several theories
have been advanced to justify the rule that criminal defendants were
incompetent to give sworn testimony. One of the original reasons
given for this infirmity was that the prosecution was required to
prove a case so completely that no defense was possible.24 Also, it
was considered treasonous for anyone, including the defendant, to be
a witness against the English Crown.25 The belief that a right to
testify would place the defendant at a disadvantage was another
reason for refusing the defendant the opportunity to testify.26
According to this line of thought, if a defendant were permitted to
take the stand, but decided not to, a jury would most likely interpret
his silence as proof of guilt.27 Similarly, if a defendant did testify, he
would be subjected to cross examination, which "might place him in
a situation where even an innocent man might appear at a
disadvantage .... ,,28 The final, and perhaps most important,
justification for not recognizing a right to testify was the fear that if
allowed to take the stand, the defendant's own interest in the
outcome of the case would cause him to perjure himself.29
21. 555 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1977). The case was heard before Circuit Judges Gibbons,
Forman and Rosen. Circuit Judge Forman wrote the opinion of the court.
22. Id. at 116. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's holding, see notes 37-53 and
accompanying text infra.
23. Popper, History and Development of the Accused's Right to Testify, 1962
WASH. U.L.Q. 454, 454; Note, Due Process v. Defense Counsel's Unilateral Waiver of
the Defendant's Right to Testify, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 517, 519 (1976).
24. Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An Emergent Constitutional
Guarantee in Criminal Trials, 9 IND. L. REV. 711, 717 (1976).
25. Id.
26. See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 578 (1961); United States v. Bentvena,
319 F.2d 916, 943 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub hom. Ormento v. United States, 375 U.S.
940 (1963).
27. United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916, 943 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Ormento v. United States, 375 U.S. 940 (1963). See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570,
578 (1961).
28. Id. See Clinton, supra note 24, at 740.
29. Clinton, supra note 24, at 740; Popper, supra note 23, at 456; Note, supra note
23, at 519-20; 3 HOFSTRA L. REV. 839, 843 (1975). In explaining this reason, one state
supreme court remarked: "The common law regarded the testimony of a defendant in
criminal actions as incompetent upon the theory, among others, that the frailty of
human nature and the overpowering desire for freedom would ordinarily induce a
person charged with a crime, if permitted to testify, to swear falsely." State v. Wilcox,
206 N.C. 691, 693, 175 S.E. 122, 123 (1934).
(VOL. 23: p. 678
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The rule that criminal defendants were incompetent to give
sworn testimony persisted until the 19th century. 3° During that
century, however, the right to testify slowly emerged in this country
as a number of state legislatures began enacting statutes that
removed the common law testimonial incompetence of criminal
defendants. 31 At present, all the states and the federal government
have statutes that guarantee a criminal defendant the right to
testify in his own behalf.
32
In the past, the issue of whether there was a constitutional right
to testify was rarely addressed by the courts, largely because the
right was created and protected by statute.33 Although the right to
testify appears to be acquiring a constitutional dimension as an
element of due process, 34 there is considerable disagreement over
36. See, e.g., Batre v. State, 18 Ala. 119 (1850); Whelchell v. State, 23 Ind. 89
(1864); State v. Laffer, 38 Iowa 422 (1874); State v. Bixby, 39 Iowa 465 (1874). See also
Note, supra note 23, at 521 n.28.
31. See Note, supra note 23, at 522.
32. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1976); 19 PA. STAT. ANN. § 681 (Purdon 1964). The
federal statute provides: "In trial of all persons charged with the commission of
offenses against the United States ... the person charged shall, at his own request,
be a competent witness." 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1976). For the text of the Pennsylvania
statute, see note 19 supra. For a list of all of the state statutes rendering a criminal
defendant competent to give sworn testimony, see Note, supra note 23, at 541-42.
33. See 3 HOFSTRA L. REV. 839, 841 (1975).
34. See Note, supra note 23, at 523-29; 3 HOFSTRA L. REv. 839, 842-45 (1975).
Although never specifically holding that there is a constitutional right to testify, the
Supreme Court has on several occasions described the right in constitutional terms. In
Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961), the Court avoided reaching the issue of
whether Georgia's incompetency statute was unconstitutional. However, in a
concurring opinion, Justice Clark expressed the view that the statute "does not meet
the requirements of due process and that, as an unsatisfactory remnant of an age
gone by, it must fall. . . ." Id. at 602 (Clark, J., concurring). In Brooks v. Tennessee,
406 U.S. 605 (1972), a state statute which required a criminal defendant to testify
before any other defense testimony was given was held to violate the privilege against
self-incrimination. Id. at 612. The Court also found that the statute infringed upon the
right to due process, stating that "whether the defendant is to testify is an important
tactical decision as well as a matter of constitutional right." Id. (emphasis added).
Similarly, in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), a case involving a defendant's
right to refuse representation by counsel, the Court commented: "This Court has often
recognized the constitutional stature of rights that, though not literally expressed in
the document, are essential to due process of law in a fair adversary process. It is now
accepted, for example, that an accused has a right to... testify on his own behalf
.... " Id. at 819 n.15 (citations omitted). For a discussion of Faretta, see notes 73-75
and accompanying text infra.
Lower federal courts have also referred to the right to testify in constitutional
terms. See, e.g., United States v. McCord, 420 F.2d 255 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States
v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916, 943 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Ormento v. United
States, 375 U.S. 940 (1963); Poe v. United States, 233 F. Supp. 173, 176 (D.D.C. 1964),
aff'd, 352 F.2d 639 (D.C. Cir. 1965). In McCord, the court stated that "as a matter of
law, a defendant is always vouchsafed the constitutional right to testify .. " 420
F.2d at 257.
The right to testify has been linked to the constitution by state courts as well.
See, e.g., Arizona v. Nobel, 109 Ariz. 539, 541, 514 P.2d 460, 462 (1973); People v.
Mosqueda, 5 Cal. App. 3d 540, 545, 85 Cal. Rptr. 346, 349 (1970); Pigg v. State, 253 Ind.
4
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whether a right to testify is specifically guaranteed by the
Constitution. 35 With the increasing distinction between statutory
and constitutional rights,36 however, resolution of this issue by the
Supreme Court seems to be inevitable.
In holding that the defendant was "unconstitutionally deprived
of the right to testify at his own trial,"37 the Third Circuit in Wilcox
concluded that the district court's articulation of a constitutional
right to testify "fairly reflects the recognition of such a right by the
federal, courts." 38 The Third Circuit determined, however, that an
alternate ground for relief existed - the sixth amendment right to
counsel.39 The court found that regardless of whether there is a
constitutional right to testify, the defendant in the instant case
clearly had a statutory right to do S0.40 Moreover, the court observed
that the defendant was entitled to be represented by counsel under
the sixth amendment. 41 The Third Circuit then determined that the
trial judge's ruling forced the defendant to choose which of these
rights he wanted to preserve. 42 In the words of the court: "The
appellee [defendant] here 'was put to a Hobson's choice:' decline to
testify and lose the opportunity of conveying his version of the facts
to the jury, or take the stand and forgo his fundamental right to be
assisted by counsel." 43 Determining that a criminal defendant
329, 330, 253 N.E.2d 266, 267 (1969). For example, the California court in Mosqueda
remarked that "a defendant's right to testify in his own behalf is merely one of many
rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution to insure
a fair trial." 5 Cal. App. 3d at 545, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
35. For cases holding that the right to testify does not have a constitutional
source, see Sims v. Lane, 411 F.2d 661, 664 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 943 (1969);
State v. McKenzie, 17 Md. App. 563, 576, 303 A.2d 406, 413 (1973); State v. Hutchinson,
458 S.W.2d 553, 554 (Mo. 1970) (en banc).
36. For a discussion of some of the differences between a statutory and
constitutional right to testify, see notes 56-69 and accompanying text infra.
37. 555 F.2d at 116.
38. Id. at 119. For a discussion of the district court's holding, see text
accompanying notes 12-17 supra.
39. 555 F.2d at 120-21. The sixth amendment provides in pertinent part: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... have the assistance of
counsel for this defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
40. 555 F.2d at 120. For the text of the Pennsylvania statute, see note 19 supra.
41. 555 F.2d at 120.
42. Id. See notes 8-9 and accompanying text supra.
43. 555 F.2d at 120, quoting United States v. Garcia, 544 F.2d 681, 685 (3d Cir.
1976). In Garcia, the court held that the defendants' fifth amendment rights against
self-incrimination were violated when they were required to give incriminating
evidence in order to obtain a lenient sentence. United States v. Garcia, 544 F.2d 681,
685 (3d Cir. 1976). The Garcia court commented:
The appellants were put to a Hobson's choice: remain silent and lose the
opportunity to be the objects of leniency, or speak and run the risk of additional
prosecution. A price tag was thus placed on appellants' expectation of maximum
consideration at the bar of justice: they had to waive the protection afforded
them by the Fifth Amendment. This price was too high.
[VOL. 23: p. 678
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should not be forced to trade one right for another, the court held
that the threatened loss of counsel and the denial of the defendant's
statutory right to testify in the instant case amounted to a
deprivation of the right to a fair trial.44 Accordingly, on this
alternate basis, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's grant
of the writ of habeas corpus.
45
Although apparently dicta, the significance of the Wilcox
decision lies in the Third Circuit's conclusion that a constitutional
right to testify, as pronounced by the district court,46 is recognized by
federal courts.47 The Third Circuit began its analysis of this issue
with the observation that at common law criminal defendants were
incompetent to give sworn testimony on their own behalf.48 Since the
right to testify is not specifically granted by the Constitution, the
court concluded that the constitutional basis for such a right would
have to be the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.49
Reviewing many of the cases that have held either that there is no
constitutional right to testify, 0 or that no relief could be granted
when the defense counsel determines as a matter of strategy that the
44. 555 F.2d at 120-21. In so holding, the Third Circuit stated:
A defendant in a criminal proceeding is entitled to certain rights and
protections which derive from a variety of sources. He is entitled to all of them;
he cannot be forced to barter one for another. When the exercise of one right is
made contingent upon the forbearance of another, both rights are corrupted.
Id. at 120. The court also noted that if the consequence of testifying would have been
the withdrawal of defense counsel, the defendant should have been informed of his
right to substitute counsel. Id.
45. Id. at 121. The court found it unnecessary to decide whether defendant was
denied effective assistance of counsel. Id. However, the court did address itself to the
problem a defense counsel faces when he believes his client's testimony will be
perjured. Id. at 121-22. The Third Circuit concluded that a breach of confidence with
the client would occur if counsel discussed a belief of perjury with the trial judge
"without possessing a firm factual basis for that belief ... " Id. at 122. The court
further stated:
While defense counsel in a criminal case assumes a dual role as a "zealous
advocate" and as an "officer of the court," neither role would countenance
disclosure to the court of counsel's private conjectures about the guilt or
innocence of his client. It is the role of the judge or jury to determine the facts,
not that of the attorney.
... It is apparent that an attorney may not volunteer a mere unsubstan-
tiated opinion that his client's protestations of innocence are perjured.
Id. See notes 5-7 and accompanying text supra.
46. See text accompanying notes 12-17 supra.
47. 555 F.2d at 119.
48. Id. at 118. See notes 23-29 and accompanying text supra.
49. 555 F.2d at 118. See notes 34-35 and accompanying text supra.
50. See 555 F.2d at 118, citing Sims v. Lane, 411 F.2d 661 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 943 (1969), Sims v. State, 246 Ind. 660, 208 N.E.2d 469 (1965), Kinder v.
Kentucky, 269 S.W.2d 212 (Ky. 1954), and State v. Hutchinson, 458 S.W.2d 553 (Mo.
1970) (en banc). See also note 35 supra.
6
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defendant should not testify,51 the Third Circuit agreed with the
district court's conclusion that such holdings are of dubious validity
in light of recent federal and state decisions.5 2 The Third Circuit
examined several of these recent cases, stating that "[they] teach
that a criminal defendant's right to testify in his own defense is of
such fundamental importance that no defendant should 'be deprived
of exercising that right and conveying his version of the facts to the
court or jury, regardless of competent counsel's advice to the
contrary.' ,3
As the district court noted, because the common law testimonial
incompetence of criminal defendants has been removed by statute in
every jurisdiction, 54 the question of whether a right to testify can be
derived from the Constitution is rarely at issue.5 5 However, the
significance of finding a constitutional, as opposed to statutory,
source for the right to testify has growing importance in a few
limited areas.
Waiver may be the most important area in which the distinction
between a constitutional and statutory right to testify is significant.
The Supreme Court has generally imposed a higher standard for
waiver of constitutional rights than for rights derived from other
sources.56 Furthermore, when the waiver of a "fundamental" right is
at issue, the defendant's personal participation is required.
5 7
51. See 555 F.2d at 118, citing United States v. Poe, 352 F.2d 639 (D.C. Cir. 1965),
United States v. Gargulio, 324 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1963), Sims v. State, 246 Ind. 660, 208
N.E.2d 469 (1965), and Kinden v. Kentucky, 269 S.W.2d 212 (Ky. 1954).
52. 555 F.2d at 118. See United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, No. 73-313, slip
op. at 13 (E.D. Pa. June 8, 1976). See also note 34 supra.
53. 555 F.2d at 119, quoting Hughes v. State, 513 P.2d 1115, 1119 (Alas. 1973).
54. See notes 31-32 and accompanying text supra.
55. United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, No. 73-313, slip op. at 11 (E.D. Pa.
June 8, 1976).
56. See, eg., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). In Johnson, which involved
the right to counsel, the Supreme Court announced the traditional standard for waiver
of constitutional rights: "'[C]ourts indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver of fundamental constitutional rights'.., we 'do not presume acquiescence in
the loss of fundamental rights.' Id. at 464 (footnotes omitted), quoting Aetna Ins. Co.
v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937), and Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities
Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937).
57. See Developments in the Law - Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REv.
1038, 1111 & n.102 (1970) (hereinafter cited as Federal Habeas Corpus]. The personal
participation of an accused is required in the following situations: 1) entering of guilty
pleas, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969); 2) waiver of the right to
counsel and the privilege against self-incrimination, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 475-76 (1966); 3) waiver of the right to appeal, Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439
(1963); and 4) waiver of the right to a jury trial, Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276,
312 (1930). In United States v. Pinkney, 551 F.2d 1241 (D.C. Cir. 1976), the District of
Columbia Circuit stated that the defendant's personal participation in a waiver of the
right to testify is required. Id. at 1251 n.60. See generally Comment, Criminal Waiver:
The Requirements of Personal Participation, Competence And Legitimate State
Interest, 54 CALF. L. REv. 1262 (1966).
[Voi. 23: p. 678684
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Therefore, it is much less likely that a defense counsel's actions with
regard to constitutional guarantees will unilaterally be able to bind
his client.
58
Courts that have refused to recognize a constitutional basis for
the right to testify have been willing to find a counsel's waiver of the
statutory right to testify effective, even over the defendant's
objection.5 9 When the testimonial right is held to be "fundamental"
or constitutional, however, the courts demand that the defendant
completely understand the significance of the waiver before holding
it effective.60 Thus, the dicta in Wilcox regarding the constitutional
origin of the right to testify may suggest that courts will be required
to assure themselves that a decision whether or not to testify is made
voluntarily, personally, and intelligently by the defendant before
finding an effective waiver of that right.61
Another area that is affected by the distinction between a
constitutional and statutory basis for the right to testify is the
appeal of harmless error. Ordinarily, an error will be deemed
harmless if it does not "affect the substantial rights of the parties,"62
or if it has not "resulted in a miscarriage of justice." 63 Where federal
constitutional rights are involved, however, the Supreme Court has
declared that the normal standard of harmless error does not
apply.64 Rather, a court must determine that an error of constitu-
58. See State v. Noble, 109 Ariz. 539, 514 P.2d 460 (1973). In Noble, the Arizona
court noted: "Fundamental constitutional rights such as the right to testify should not
be deemed waived by an independent determination on the part of defendant's
counsel and the matter should be subject to the defendant's consideration before the
waiver is made part of trial strategy." Id. at 541, 514 P.2d at 462. For a discussion of
the waiver issue in federal habeas corpus actions, Bee Federal Habeas Corpus, supra
note 57, at 1103-12.
59. See Sims v. Lane, 411 F.2d 661 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 943 (1969).
After concluding that the federal privilege to testify was "merely statutory," the
Seventh Circuit in Sims stated that "the federal rule seems to be that the exercise of
this right is subject to the determination of competent trial counsel and varies with
the facts of each case." 411 F.2d at 664. See also Hodgens v. United States, 340 F.2d
391, 396 (3d Cir. 1965) (decision of counsel not to permit defendant to testify was not
proof of counsel's incompetence, rather it was an example of good trial tactics); United
States ex rel. Dancy v. Handy, 203 F.2d 407, 426-28 (3d Cir. 1953) (trial judge should
not interfere with counsel's decision not to call defendant to the stand in a criminal
action).
60. See Hughes v. State, 513 P.2d 1115, 1119-20 (Alas. 1973) (defendant must
make final decision to waive the right to testify).
61. For a discussion of this aspect of the court's holding, see notes 46-53 and
accompanying text supra.
62. See 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1970); FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a). See also Gillian v. City of
Omaha, 524 F.2d 1013 (8th Cir. 1975). The Gillian court, in a civil case, held that the
error must affect the "substantial rights of the objecting party" to constitute
reversible error. Id. at 1015, citing 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1970).
63. See, e.g., CAL. CONsT. art. 6, § 13.
64. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
8
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tional magnitude is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt before it
can uphold the trial court decision.65 Moreover, the Court has
indicated that some constitutional rights are "so basic to a fair trial
that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error .... ,,66
Hence, if, as Wilcox suggests, the fourteenth amendment provides a
federal constitutional right to testify,6 7 its denial in a particular case
will most likely constitute an error compelling reversal. Furthermore,
this right may be found to be so fundamental that its denial will
always require reversal.
Additionally, the recognition of a constitutional source for the
right to testify would permit a collateral attack of a state court
denial thereof in a federal habeas corpus proceeding.68 Finally, if the
right to testify is protected by the fourteenth amendment, then it is
axiomatic that a state could not, without violating the Federal
Constitution, repeal its competency statute in order to render a
defendant unable to give sworn testimony in his own behalf.
6 9
In most of the cases involving the right to testify, the underlying
policy issue appears to be the degree of control a criminal defendant
should have in the preparation of his own defense. Courts that refuse
to find a constitutional right to testify seem to allocate substantial
power to the defense counsel, holding his decisions to be binding,
even if vigorous disagreement and objection is voiced by his client.
7°
Those cases finding a constitutional right to testify, in contrast,
recognize more authority in the defendant; therefore, counsel's
tactical actions which are made without consultation or over
objection will not necessarily be upheld. 71 Obviously, allocation of
65. Id. at 24. See Comment, A Multi-Rule Approach to Harmless Constitutional
Error, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 202 (1970). See also United States v. DeLoach, 504 F.2d 185
(D.C. Cir. 1974), aff'd on rehearing, 530 F.2d 990 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
909 (1976).
66. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967). See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963) (right to counsel); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 568 (1958)
(coerced confessions); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927) (impartial judge).
67. See notes 46-53 and accompanying text supra.
68. Section 2241 of the federal judicial code provides in pertinent part: "The writ
of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless . . . [h]e is in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)(3) (1970). If the origin of the right to testify is merely statutory, no federal
habeas corpus relief would be available for denial of a state statutory right to testify.
Thus, recognizing a constitutional basis for the right to testify would provide federal
habeas corpus relief for state court deprivations of that right. See id.
69. Accord, Note, supra note 23, at 527.
70. See Sims v. Lane, 411 F.2d 661, 664 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 943 (1969);
United States v. Poe, 352 F.2d 639, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1965); United States v. Garguilo, 324
F.2d 795, 797 (2d Cir. 1963).
71. See Hughes v. State, 513 P.2d 115, 119 (Alas. 1973); People v. Robles, 2 Cal.3d
205, 215, 406 P.2d 710, 716, 85 Cal. Rptr. 166, 172 (1970). Cf. United States v. Pinkney,
551 F.2d 1241, 1251 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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power between attorney and client is necessary, inter alia, to foster
judicial economy and efficiency. 72 When attorney and client disagree
on a matter of central importance to basic trial strategy, however, it
seems clear that the client's will must control.
In Faretta v. California,73 the Supreme Court held that a
criminal defendant has an independent constitutional right to
proceed in the absence of counsel upon his voluntary and intelligent
election.7 4 Implicit in the Court's conclusion is the recognition that
crucial decisions affecting the management of an accused's defense
are to be made by the defendant himself.7 5 In intimating a
constitutional right to testify, the Third Circuit in Wilcox has
likewise perceived that control of a defense with respect to basic
strategic decisions ultimately belongs to the defendant rather than
his attorney. Therein lies the true significance of Wilcox.
In suggesting a constitutional source for the right to testify, the
Wilcox decision represents the Third Circuit's awareness that the
ability to give sworn testimony on one's own behalf is basic among a
criminal defendant's rights. While constitutional protection of the
right is ordinarily not significant due to the existence of statutes
rendering criminal defendants competent witnesses, 76 it becomes
vital in several areas, particularly waiver, harmless error, and
habeas corpus relief from state court judgments.7 7 More importantly,
however, Wilcox represents a basic policy determination that
controlling authority in the presentation of a criminal defense must
be given to the defendant. An attorney is, after all, his client's
servant and not his master.
72. See Federal Habeas Corpus, supra note 57, at 1110-11.
73. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
74. Id. at 832-35.
75. See id. at 834. The Faretta court noted: "The right to defend is personal. The
defendant, and not his lawyer or the state, will bear the personal consequences of a
conviction. It is the defendant, therefore, who must be free personally to decide
whether in his particular case counsel is to his advantage." Id. In discussing Faretta,
the Second Circuit in United States v. Armedo-Sarmiento, 524 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1975),
stated that "the right to manage one's own defense is at the heart of the Sixth
Amendment guarantees." Id. at 492.
76. See notes 31 & 32 and accompanying text supra.
77. See notes 56-68 and accompanying text supra.
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